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SCREENING, PLEA BARGAINS AND THE INNOCENT PROBLEM 
Oren Gazal 
Abstract and a Summary of the Key Argument 
Abstract 
Courts in common law countries reject plea-agreements only when the agreed 
upon sentence is seen as exceedingly lenient. This judicial intervention is 
designed to ensure that plea-bargaining does not undermine deterrence. Many 
legal scholars argue against this policy, claiming that courts should prohibit 
plea-bargaining all together. They argue that the plea-bargaining system 
increases the risk of wrongful convictions. Economists often criticize this  
judicial intervention as well, but for a different reason. Rather than advocating 
the abolition of plea-bargaining, many economists argue that the courts should 
accept all plea-agreements without review. They claim that plea-bargaining 
can help ensure an efficient use of prosecutorial resources and thus help 
maximize deterrence. In the paper, I will argue that a plea-bargaining system 
that includes judicial review is superior to both of these suggested alternatives. 
Moreover, I will show that the prohibition of exceedingly lenient sentences is 
justified,  not because it ensures appropriate deterrence, but because it can 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. When the evidence against a certain 
defendant is weak, the prosecution is usually willing to offer him a lower 
sentence in plea-bargaining in order to ensure his conviction. Such a 
defendant would not accept an offer to plead guilty unless he receives a 
substantial concession in the agreement. Thus lenient plea-bargaining can 
indicate that the evidence against the defendant is we ak. Given that weak 
evidence can indicate a higher probability of factual innocence, it is likely that 
the percentage of innocent defendants is relatively higher among defend ants 
that are offered an exceptionally lenient plea-bargains. When courts prevent 
these types of agreements, they force the prosecutor either to go to trial or to 
dismiss the case. At the same time, the court would accept plea-bargains in 
strong cases because in these cases, prosecutors can achieve defendants'  
agreements to settle even without offering them exceedingly lenient 
concessions. By hindering the prosecutor's ability to agree to exceedingly 
lenient sentences, courts increase the cost of handling weak cases, without 
obstructing the prosecutor's ability to settle stronger cases.  This helps to 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions by encouraging the prosecutor to 
pursue the cases of defendants that are more likely to be guilty and to dismiss 
the cases against defendants that more likely to be innocent.  
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Summary of the Key Argument 
The paper will show that, contrary to the general supposition, a plea-bargaining 
system with judicial review protects innocent defendants better than either a system 
without plea-bargaining or a system with unreviewable plea-bargaining. 
The topic of plea-bargaining generates one of the fiercest debates about criminal 
procedure in common-law countries. The opposition to the practice bases its 
arguments on several different grounds. Some argue that the use of bargaining in 
criminal law is immoral (Alschuler, 1981), or that the agreements reached through 
this process are tainted by coercion (Kipnis, 1976). Others claim that the practice 
diverts the court from its responsibility to find the truth (Gross, 1992), and that plea-
bargaining transfers too much discretion from the court to the prosecutor (Alschuler, 
1976).  
From a consequential point of view, the two main arguments that must be addressed 
in order to defend plea-bargaining concentrate on the allegedly incorrect distribution 
of sentences  that the system produces. First, it is argued that the plea-bargaining 
system increases the risk that an innocent defendant might plead guilty in return for 
leniency (Schulhofer, 1992). This argument has become known as the "innocent 
problem." Second, it is asserted that the leniency offered to defendants in exchange 
for their guilty plea undermines the ability of the criminal justice system to promote 
the goals of punishment, i.e. deterre nce, incapacitation, and retribution. (Alschuler, 
1981).  
As one might expect, most law and economics scholars clearly support an unrestricted 
use of plea-bargaining (Landes, 1971). They view plea-bargaining as a simple 
marketplace transaction, and claim that no imperfection justifies its regulation 
(Easterbrook, 1983). They argue that protecting the defendant cannot justify 
preventing him from selling his right to trial. Plea-bargaining is only an option, and 
when it harms the defendant's interest, he can always reject it.  In a similar manner, 
they maintain that limiting plea-bargaining does not protect public interest. The 
prosecution is in a better position to ensure the public interest than the judiciary. In 
adversarial legal systems, it is the parties' responsibility to represent their respective 
interests. It is the role of the prosecutor to protect the public interest, while the 
3
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defense attorney must represent the interests of the defendant. The court must render a 
decision only when these different interests are in conflict. Thus , when both sides 
reach an agreement in the shadow of the court, they indicate that the agreement better 
serve both the public interest and the defendant's interest (Church, 1979). Of course, 
agency problems and bounded rationality can lead to mistakes – but these 
imperfections lead to even worse results when a full court trial takes place (Scott & 
Stuntz, 1992). 
The basic economic model of plea-bargaining (Landes, 1971) assumes that the 
prosecutor has unlimited discretion to reach a plea-agreement in which the conviction 
and punishment are set. The prosecutor is subject to resource constraints and cannot 
try all of the cases that she would like. As a result, the prosecutor tries to maximize 
the overall sum of punishments imposed on the defendants that deserve punishment in 
her opinion.1 Therefore her goal is to equalize marginal punishment per resources. 
When a prosecutor settles a case out of court, she saves resources and ensures 
conviction in return for a punishment that is lower than the one that would be 
expected after a trial. The prosecutor determines the minimal sentence for which she 
is willing to settle by taking into account the expected sentence if a trial is held, and 
the cost of such a trial. In economic terms, this sentence is her reservation price. In 
contrast, the defendant determines the maximal sentence to which he would agree by 
taking into account his estimation of the potential trial result, and the personal costs of 
going to court (such as anxiety and legal fees). This sentence is his reservation price. 
 
The prosecutor can offer the defendant an agreed sentence in return for his plea. Since 
she is a monopolist and a repeat player, she can create a reputation as an attorney that 
                                                 
1 This is generally a reasonable assumption. If the prosecutor seeks maximum deterrence or incapacitation then the 
maximization strategy is clearly reasonable. This strategy is also reasonable if she seeks the imposition of 
punishments that only fit the crime, as long as the court's verdicts generally reflect the fair punishment. This is 
because the prosecutor cannot reach an agreement in which the punishment would be harsher than the one 
expected to be imposed by the court after trial. She can only bargain in the shadow of the law or take the case to 
court. In any case the punishment cannot exceed the one expected to be imposed by the court after conviction. 
Therefore, even if we believe that the prosecutor's aim is to impose penalties according to a retributive criterion, 
the maximization assumption gives  us a good tool for analyzing her behavior. It is also worth noting that the 
model does not assume that the prosecutor does not impute a defendant corruptively and prosecutes him even if 
he is innocent. The model does not assume anything about the way the prosecutor chooses who deserves 
punishment, and although she would presumably only charge people she believed to be guilty, corruption or 
subjective and non-established beliefs that a person is guilty could lead her to implicate the innocent.  
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goes to trial whenever her offer is rejected. This allows her to offer agreement s on a 
"take it or leave it" basis. If the prosecutor knows the defendant's reservation price, 
she could extract his entire surplus by offering him a sentence which is just below this 
price. However, in the more likely occurrence that the defendant's reservation price is 
unknown, the prosecutor would need to take into account the probability that the 
defendant would refuse her offer.  In order to reduce the risk of refusal, the prosecutor 
is likely to offer a sentence lower than the reservation price of an average defendant in 
similar cases. Thus, the defendant is likely to gain some surplus from the plea-
bargaining process.  
Using the above analysis, we can now address the plea-bargaining opponents' two 
main arguments. First ly, the suggestion that plea-bargaining leads to leniency, and 
thus undermines deterrence, is incorrect. In exchange for offering a degree of leniency 
to defendants, the prosecutor could increase the number of cases she is able to 
prosecute, and thus actually  increase deterrence.2 Secondly, the plea-bargaining 
process does not harm innocent defendants, as a defendant would only accept a deal if 
he believed that a trial provided a real threat of a harsher sentence. Thus, when a 
defendant could show his innocence in court, the prosecutor would not be able to 
force him to accept a plea-agreement. When a defendant knows that he might be 
convicted in a trial, plea-bargaining can serve as an insurance  against a more severe 
sentence. Removing the option of plea-bargaining from an innocent defendant only 
worsens his already grave situation.  
In fact, as Grossman & Katz, 1983 showed, the percentage of wrongful convictions 
actually would be lower in a system where plea-bargaining is available. When 
agreements are forbidden, both innocent and guilty defendants have a chance of being 
acquitted in court. Alternatively, in a system that allows plea-bargaining, only 
defendants that refuse the prosecutor's offer can be found innocent.  While a guilty 
defendant might refuse a plea bargain offer, an innocent defendant is much more 
likely to refuse such an offer, because he has a better chance at trial. While the 
defendant knows with assurance whether he is guilty, the prosecutor only has an 
estimation about his guilt. A guilty defendant knows that the facts revealed in court 
                                                 
2 Similarly, by agreeing to penalties that are lower than the retributively-appropriate penalty, the prosecutor can 
ensure that more offenders that deserve punishment will be punished.  
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might increase the probability of his conviction.  In contrast, an innocent defendant 
knows that court proceedings could reveal information that would assist his claim of 
innocence. Thus, the guilty defendant would  most likely estimate the chances of his 
acquittal to be lower than the prosecutor's estimation, while the innocent defendant's 
estimation of the probability of a not- guilty verdict would be higher than the 
prosecutor's estimation.  Hence, guilty defendants are more likely to accept 
prosecutors’ offer than innocent defendants. As a result, the percentage of innocent 
defendants that refuse plea-bargain offers and go to trial is higher than the percentage 
of guilty ones. Because going to trial provides a chance for acquittal, and since guilty 
defendants are more likely to accept a deal out of court, the plea-bargaining system 
actually  reduces the rate of wrongful convictions (Scott & Stuntz, 1992).  
It is important to note that in this sce nario, the actual number of innocent defendants 
that would be convicted does not decrease. In fact, the number would be higher. This 
is the result of the fact that the overall number of defendants would rise when plea-
bargaining is allowed. As there are always innocent people among indicted 
defendants, an increase in the number of defendants prosecuted and convicted would 
increase the number of innocent defendants convicted as well. However, this 
occurrence does not justify the limitation of plea-bargaining because the most 
important factor is not the number of wrongful convictions, but their percentage 
among overall convictions. It is not only bad to convict innocent defendants, it is also 
good to convict guilty ones. If the percentage of wrongful convictions was less 
important than the number of innocent defendants convicted, then every penal system 
could be improved by arbitrarily acquitting half of the defendants. Such an action 
would reduce the number of innocent defendants that were convicted by half.  This 
would not, however, change the percentage of wrongful convictions among those that 
were declared guilty. Few people would support such a reform.  
In practice, the complete abolition of the plea-bargaining system has not occurred. 
Different forms of p lea-agreements are widespread in different common law 
countries. However, in some jurisdictions the arguments against plea-bargaining 
systems have become incorporated into its implementation. In the United States, the 
general rule is that the prosecutor's sentence recommendation does not bind the court. 
Thus, if the court holds that the suggested sentence is too light, it has the authority to 
impose a higher one after the defendant has pled guilty. This rule is aimed to address 
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the concern that plea-agreements would lead to excessively lenient sentences. 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States appears to have adopted the law 
and economics scholars’ arguments against the "innocent problem". Since the court 
believes that an innocent defendant is better off with the option to plea-bargain, no 
judicial measures have been taken to prevent a rational, innocent defendant from 
pleading guilty in return for leniency. The most striking example of this approach is 
found in the famous Alford case.3 In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States 
accepted a guilty plea from a defendant that openly proclaimed his innocence but 
preferred the more lenient punishment offered to defendants that pled guilty to the 
risk of a trial.4   
While an Alford-type plea is not allowed in Israel, the general approach to plea-
bargaining is similar. When an informed defendant accepts a plea-bargain offer, the 
only responsibilities of an Israeli court are to ensure that the concession is not overly 
lenient, and to impose a harsher sentence if it is. The court justifies this approach with 
the need to ensure that a plea-bargain sentence maintains a necessary level of 
deterrence. At the same time, there is no rule to ensure that a rational, innocent 
defendant does not plead guilty. This approach might satisfy those who believe that 
the plea-bargaining system leads to unjustified leniency. However, it is criticized by 
both scholars who are concerned with the innocent problem and economists that 
object to the additional expense of any court intervention.  
In the paper I will argue that judicial review of extremely lenient punishments is 
justified, but for different reasons than given by the courts. It is generally believed 
that this type of review can be justified by the need to increase deterrence. However, 
economic literature shows that when courts prevent very lenient sentences in plea-
agreements, they might actually reduce deterrence. I will attempt to justify the judicial 
review of plea-bargain punishments with the need to protect innocent defendants. I 
will try to show that judicial review of plea-agreements can reduce the percentage of 
wrongful convictions. That is to say that if one wants to minimize the percentage of 
wrongful convictions, a plea-bargaining system with judicial review is superior to 
                                                 
3 North Carolina v. Alford 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
4 According to North Carolina law at the time, a defendant that pled guilty to first -degree murder received a 30-
year imprisonment sentence. Alternatively, he faced the death penalty if convicted in a jury trial. 
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both the abolishment of plea-bargaining and the institution of unlimited bargaining 
without judicial review. Through the use of an example, I will try to indicate the 
criterion that should be used by the court to review a plea-agreement.  I will also 
suggest a change in the judicial method of intervention, when the criterion for such an 
intervention is satisfied. 
In order to understand how a plea-bargaining system with judicial review protects the 
innocent, one needs to understand the inherent dangers to innocent defendants within 
the other two systems. The dangers posed by unreviewable plea-agreements are most 
vividly illustrated by an example provided by Prof. Alschuler, one of the fiercest 
opponents to the plea-bargaining system. Alschuler presents his argument against 
plea-bargaining through this example: 
"San Francisco defense attorney Benjamin M. Davis recently 
represented a man charged with kidnapping and forcible rape. The 
defendant was innocent, Davis says, and after investigating the case 
Davis was confident of an acquittal. The prosecutor, who seems to 
have shared the defense attorney's opinion on this point, offered to 
permit a guilty plea to simple battery. Conviction on this charge 
would not have led to a greater sentence than thirty days' 
imprisonment, and there was every likelihood that the defendant 
would be granted probation. When Davis informed his client of this 
offer, he emphasized that conviction at trial seemed highly 
improbable. The defendant's reply was simple: 'I can't take the 
chance.' " (Alschuler, 1968) 
Because  charge bargaining is not subject to a court's review, this case provides an 
example of unreviewable plea-bargaining. The prosecutor decided to pursue this rape 
case because she believed that the defendant should be punished, and because she 
concluded that the result of the process (battery conviction and up to 30 days of 
imprisonment) was worth its costs.  That is to say that the prosecutor preferred 
allocating her limited resources to this rape case rather than to a stronger alternative 
case that was for a milder offence. In this plea-bargaining system, the costs of the 
weaker rape case are equal to the costs of the stronger theft case, while the benefit for 
the prosecutor (the resulting sentence) is higher in the rape case than they are in the 
theft case. In this way, it can be argued, that the plea-bargaining system sometimes 
encourages the prosecutor to pursue cases against defendants that are more likely to 
be innocent and to dismiss cases in which the likelihood of innocence is lower. 
8
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In part, Alschuler is correct. Certain types of plea-bargaining systems can endanger 
innocent defendants. However, he is incorrect when he argues that prohibiting plea-
bargaining would protect the defendants better. As the following argument illustrates, 
this is not necessarily the case.   
For the purposes of the following example ,  assume plea-bargaining is prohibited. 
Within this context, apply a similar scenario to the one described above , in which the 
prosecutor must choose between two cases due to limited resources. The first case is a 
rape case in which there is a low probability of conviction, while the second one is a 
simple theft case in which there is a high probability of conviction. To serve her 
interests, the prosecutor would  prefer the case in which the expected sentence 
achieved per resources spent would be the highest. The expected sentence per 
resources (SPR) for case i can be presented as SPRi=Si·Pi/Ri, where Si is the sentence 
if the defendant is found guilty in a trial in case i (i=1 the rape case; i=2 the theft 
case), Pi is the probability of conviction for case i, and Ri are the resources needed to 
try case i. Though P1<P2, the fact that S1>S2 makes it a reasonable possibility that 
S1·P1/R1>S2·P2/R2, in which case the prosecutor would prefer to pursue the rape case. 
The prosecutor's decision would depend on the size of R1, which could be bigger or 
smaller than R2, and on the exact difference between P1 and P2. In Alschuler's 
example, the prosecutor might still pre fer to take the defendant in the rape case to 
trial, if she calculates that this would yield a higher SPR than the theft case. It should 
be noted here that if the prohibition of plea-bargaining is not accompanied by an 
increase of  prosecutorial resources, then the prosecutor that had previously settled the 
rape case would be more likely to dismiss both cases due to lack of resources. 
However, this does not undermine the argument that the prohibition of plea-
bargaining is not likely to protect the innocent. This shortage of resources would raise 
the minimal SPR which the prosecutor would require in order to pursue a case. In this 
situation, however, the prosecutor would still have to make decisions in order to 
maximize the SPR, and therefore she might still prefer cases with a low P and high S 
to cases with high P and a low S.  
Adding judicial review to the plea-bargaining system is likely to alter the prosecutor's 
choice. If the court intervenes and disregards a sentencing recommendation whenever 
it is exceedingly lenient, (i.e. much lower than Si), then this would decrease the 
9
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prosecutor's credibility when she promises an exceedingly lenient sentence. When Pi 
is very low, the only way to encourage the defendant to accept a settlement is to offer 
him a sentence that is much lower than Si. However, this option would become 
impossible  in this situation, because it would become clear to the defendant that the 
court would not accept such an agreement. The result would be that when the 
prosecution has a weak case against a defendant, the defendant would refuse any plea-
bargain offer, if the sentence is subject to court's review.  
In simplest terms, the prosecutor would be presented with two types of cases: strong 
cases and weak cases. The prosecutor could offer a settlement in which the 
punishment would not need to be much lower than S, in order to entice a defendant 
against which there is strong case (when P is high), to accept it. However, in weak 
cases (when P is low), most defendants would reject any offered plea-bargain.  When 
the plea-bargain sentence is high, the defendant would refuse it in order to pursue his 
high probability of acquittal. Conversely, when the offered sentence is low, the 
defendant would refuse it because of his belief that the court would reject the 
recommendation and impose a harsher one.  
Hence, in this situation,  the prosecutor would be able to reach agreements only in 
strong cases. Since a settled case is less expensive to conduct, she would prefer to 
pursue strong cases instead of weak ones. If we consider our original example within 
this context, it is likely that the prosecutor would pursue the theft case rather than the 
rape case. The cost of prosecuting the rape defendant would be much higher than the 
cost of prosecuting the theft defendant, because the prosecutor would need to try the 
rape case, while she could simply settle the theft case. At the same time, the expected 
sentence (probability times the sentence, P·S) in both cases is almost the same. In the 
rape case, the sentence is very high, while the probability of conviction is very low. In 
the theft case, the sentence is low, but because of the agreement, a conviction is 
assured. Since the difference in the expected sentences is small, it cannot compensate 
for the large difference in the amount  of resources needed to complete these two 
cases. Thus, adding judicial review to the plea-bargaining system encourages the 
prosecution to take strong cases and dismiss weak ones. 
A simple example might help to clarify this conclusion. Assume that a prosecutor 
wants to maximize the  sum of the sentences of the cases she pursues. Further assume, 
10
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for simplicity, that the prosecuto r knows that all of the defendants' reservation prices 
are equal to the expected sentences (i.e. it equals Si·Pi). The prosecutor has 9 units of 
resources (for example, 9 months of human labor). A trial costs 3 units, while a 
settlement costs 1 unit. Therefore, the prosecutor can either try 3 cases or settle 9 
cases. After the prosecutor selects the cases that she believes deserve legal action, she 
is left with the following 20 cases: 
Probability 































































The above table shows 20 cases, 4 cases for each offence: theft, battery, robbery, rape 
and manslaughter. The cases are also different iated by the  probability of conviction 
(P).  Hence, in one theft case the probability of a conviction (case i=1) is 90%, in the 
second (case i=6) it is 60%, in the third (case i=11) it is 40%, and in the forth (case 
i=16) it is 15%. The same probabilities exist for the other offences. The numbers in 
the table represent the expected sentence in years of imprisonment if a trial takes 
place (Si·P i.). This also would be the sentence in the case of a settlement, since we 
have assumed that this would be the reservation price of all defendants.5 Column C 
represents the probability that the defendant is guilty, according to the evidence at the 
prosecutor’s disposal.6  
                                                 
5 This reservation price means that all defendants are risk neutral for sentence. 
6 I assumed that the level of evidence needed for convictions ("beyond reasonable doubt") is equal to 95%. Hence, 
when C>95%, it is likely that the court will find that there is enough evidence for conviction. However, the court 
still might have a different evaluation of the evidence than the prosecutor, and therefore it might still acquit the 
defendant. If there is no systematic deviation between the prosecutor's evaluation of the evidence and the court's 
evaluation, then the defendant, if brought to court, is likely to be convicted (P>50%), when the probability of 
guilt is higher than 95% (C>95%). Similarly, when the prosecutor estimates, according to her evidence, that there 
is less than a 95% chance that the defendant is truly guilty, she would also estimate that the likelihood of 
conviction is less than 50% (i.e. if C<95% then P<50%). Clearly, the more likely it is that the defendant 
11
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The social cost of convicting an innocent defendant is much higher than the social 
cost of acquitting a guilty defendant. Accordingly, society demands a high likelihood 
of guilt, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt, before supporting a conviction. In the 
example above, I assumed that the critical level of proof that justifies conviction is 
95%. Thus, in this case, it is in the public interest to convict a defendant if, and only 
if, C>95% and P>50%. According to these guidelines, the defendants represented is 
the two bottom lines of the table (cases i=11…20 – shaded in gray) should not be 
convicted.  
We will now apply this calculation to the three possible judicial systems previously 
discussed. In an unreviewable plea-bargaining system, it is in the prosecutor's interest 
to settle all of the cases that she pursues. This strategy would allow her to pursue nine 
cases. The nine cases which collectively yield the highest sentence are: 2, 3, 4,  5, 9, 
10, 14, 15 & 20 presented in the following table :7 
Probability 






























































   
Three of these nine cases are weak cases; that is to say that they have a C<95% 
probability of guilt (cases 14, 15 & 20).  It is socially undesirable to allow these 
defendants to face conviction. Pursuing the cases against these defendants also leaves 
the prosecutor without any resources to pursue other cases for which C>95% (such as 
cases 1, 6, 7 & 8).  
                                                                                                                                           
committed the offence (C), the higher the probability of conviction (P). The table illustrates this type of 
relationship between C and P. 
7 In this example, the critical SPR is 3.75 years of imprisonment per unit of resources. 
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If plea-bargaining is not allowed, the prosecutor must try all of the cases that she 
selects. Thus, she can only pursue three cases. The three cases that collectively yield 
the highest prison term are the three ma nslaughter cases presented below (cases 5, 10 
& 15). One of these cases (case i=15) has a probability of guilt that is C<95%. Thus, 
the result is similar to the outcome of the first system discussed: one third of the cases 
pursued have an insufficient body of evidence to justify a prosecution that might 
result in a conviction. 
 
Probability 































































However, when plea-bargaining is allowed but subjected to judicial review, the 
ultimate result is altered. Assume that the court does not allow settlements in which 
the agreed sentence is lower than ½S.8 Thus, the prosecutor can only settle cases in 
which P>50% (cases 1-10). If the prosecutor wants to pursue other cases, she must try 
them in court and spend three times more resources for each case. This would 
encourage  her to pursue only strong cases. In our example, the prosecutor would  settle 
the nine cases marked in the following table (cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 & 10.) 
 
                                                 
8 If the court, instead of forbidding such settlements, increases the sentence whenever such a sentence is reached, 
the result will be similar, because a defendant would know that the court would ignore the prosecutor’s promise 
of an exceedingly lenient sentence, and thus he would not agree to such a plea-bargain. 
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In each of these cases, the probability of guilt is high enough to justify prosecution.9 
Unlike the first two systems discussed, none of the defendants that are more likely to 
be innocent are prosecuted. Therefore, adding judicial review to the plea-bargaining 
system reduces the risk that innocent defendants will be prosecuted and convicted.  
The argument above relies on certain assumptions about the prosecutor's and 
defendant's decision making processes, most of which are commonly held 
assumptions in the economic literature. Still, in order to strengthen the argument, I 
will illustrate that the paper's conclusions hold true even in a more complex real world 
setting.  
For example, I assume that the prosecutor's sole aim, when deciding how to utilize her 
resources in the best way, is to maximize her overall sentence terms. According to this 
logic, the prosecutor chooses which defendant to prosecute only on the basis of the 
severity of their offence and the probab ility of their conviction. However, it is likely 
that the prosecutor tries to pursue additional objectives when she decides who to 
prosecute. For example, the prosecutor might want to avoid the risk of loosing a case 
in a jury trial, because of the public criticism that she might face. In addition, she 
might prefer pursuing high profile cases for political reasons, even if their SPR is low.  
                                                 
9 In another example, it still might be worthwhile for the prosecutor to pursue a case even though she cannot settle 
it. Thus, adopting a system with reviewable plea bargaining does not ensure that only strong cases would be 
pursued. However, it is clear that the percentage of weak cases that would be pursued in this system is 
substantially lower because of the relatively high expense required to conduct these cases.  
14
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 31 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art31
Oren Gazal Plea-Bargaining Key Argument Draft 11/4/04 
 14  
However, the main conclusion is still valid even if the prosecutor takes such 
considerations into account. In fact, the addition of some considerations into the 
model for the prosecution's decision making process might even strengthen the 
argument. For example, if the prosecutor gives special consideration to the risk of 
loosing at a trial, she will refrain from prosecuting weak cases even more than the 
basic model predicts. In these circumstances, the prosecutor has additional incentive 
to pursue only the cases she can conclude through a plea-agreement, because these 
cases will almost certainly end with a conviction. Pursuing a weak case in a 
reviewable plea-bargaining system will lead to a jury tr ial that might end in an 
acquittal.  
On the other hand, the prosecutor might consider the degree to which a case is high-
profile, in addition to its severity and strength. As a result, the prosecutor might prefer 
a high-profile, weak case to a strong, less famous case, even if she needs to try the 
former case in court, and the latter can be concluded through a plea-agreement. This 
might pose a severer challenge to this thesis. However, as long as the prosecutor gives 
some consideration to the cost of a possible trial when screening a case, and as long as 
plea-bargains are less expensive than jury trials, judicial review of exceedingly lenient 
cases will reduce the severity of the innocent problem. 
Several policy conclusions can be derived from the paper's analysis. First, all types of 
plea-bargaining and settlement systems should include judicial review or another 
mechanism that prevents exceedingly lenient sentences. If the aim of judicial review 
is to reduce the percentage  of innocent defendants facing trial, then there must be 
judicial review of both sentence bargaining and charge bargaining.  One can apply 
this analysis to evaluate different settlement systems .10 For example, in civil law 
countries, this argument leads to the conclusion that the German Penal-Order system 
(Strafbefehlsverfahren) and the Italian Agreed Penalty system (Patteggiamento) are 
more effective at protecting the innocent than the Dutch or Belgian transactions 
(transactie), because agreements in the former are subject to judicial approval while 
agreements in the latter are not.  
                                                 
10 In many European countries, the prosecutor has the power to settle a case before trial in a manner that has some 
similarities to the plea bargaining system in common law countries. 
15
Gazal:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
Oren Gazal Plea-Bargaining Key Argument Draft 11/4/04 
 15  
Second, this analysis provides the criterion by which the court should determine when 
a suggested settlement should be rejected. The court should reject the recommended 
sentence when the offered sentence is lower than the highest sentence a defendant 
with 50% chances of acquittal would accept. When the agreed sentence is this low, 
then it is an indication that the parties believe that the chances that the court would 
find reasonable doubt are higher than the chances that it would not. Essentially, this 
means that the parties believe that there is reasonable doubt according to the available 
evidence.  
Third, when the court rejects the parties' sentence recommendation, it should allow 
the defendant to withdraw his plea. Currently, when the court rejects a plea-agreement 
in common law countries, it usually results in the imposition of a harsher sentence 
than the one prescribed in the agreement.  On the other hand, there are some types of 
plea-agreements, available in different jurisdictions, in which the defendant is entitled 
to a full trial if the agreement is rejected by the court.11  
When a defendant knows, in advance, the cases in which the court would reject an 
agreement, it is unimportant whether he is allowed to withdraw his plea of guilt after 
the agreement is rejected. In such a case, the defendant would refuse any sentence 
recommendation that he knows the court will not respect. However, when it is 
impossible to predict with certainty whether the court would accept a plea-agreement, 
the defendant's ability to withdraw his plea becomes critical. A court is most likely to 
increase  the sentence of a defendant who had gained a significant concession from the 
prosecutor. However, this significant concession can be a signal that the prosecution's 
case is weak, and thus can indicate a higher likelihood of innocence. This type of 
intervention is particularly risky for the defendants who are most likely to be 
innocent. For this reason, the reviewable settlement systems in continental Europe, 
such as the German Penal Order System or the Italian Agreed Penalty System, are 
superior to most plea-bargaining systems in common law countries, because the y 
allow the defendant to go to trial after the court rejects the parties' recommendation.  
                                                 
11 For example, Rule 11(c)(1) to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure distinguishes between three types of plea 
agreements: an agreement about the charges (type A agreement), an agreement to recommend a sentence (type B 
agreement) and an agreement for a specific sentence or sentence range (type C agreement). To the extent that the 
plea agreement is a type B, the defendant does not have the right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow 
the parties' recommendation. On the other hand, when the court rejects a type A or type C agreement, it must 
allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.  
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Fourth, judicial review of plea-bargaining can serve as a good substitute for the pre 
trial hearings that are designed to establish that there is sufficient evidence to justify 
prosecution. Both pre-trial hearings and reviewable plea-bargaining systems screen 
out the weak cases before going to trial, however the former is not as effective as the 
latter is  in this regard.  In most systems, it is too difficult for the court to estimate the 
strength of evidence in a short pretrial hearing.  As a result, this process is often a 
mere formality. In contrast, when the court reviews plea-agreements, it increases the 
cost of weak cases. As a result, it encourages the prosecution to screen out this type of 
cases. This process prevents weak cases from going to trial without relying on the 
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